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DOUGLAS A. KAHN, Professor of Law, University 
of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and 
EARL M. COLSON, of the Washington, D.C. Bar 
The gift tax is imposed on the 
"transfer of property by gift." IN­
TERNAL REVENUE CoDE OF 1954 
(hereafter "Code") §2501. The term 
gift is not expressly defined either 
in the Code or in the Treasury Regu­
lations. However, section 2512(b), 
dealing with the valuation of gifts, 
states that "where property is trans­
ferred for less than an adequate 
and full consideration in money or 
money's worth," the difference be­
tween the value of the property 
transferred and the consideration 
received constitutes a gift. 
Thus, for gift tax purposes, the 
determination of whether a gift was 
made does not turn so much on the 
intent of the transferor as it does 
on the mechanics of the transfer­
whether property was transferred 
without full and adequate consid­
eration in money and · money's 
worth. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l (g) 
(1). The absence of donative intent 
still can be a significant factor. 
The gift tax applies only to trans­
fers by individuals, but a transfer 
of property by an entity such as a 
corporation may be attributed to 
Editors' Note: This article is based on a chapter in the ALl-ABA Practice 
Handbook, FEDERAL TAXATION OF EsTATEs, GIFTS, AND TRusTs, by Douglas A. 
Kahn and Earl M. Colson ( 1975). The book may be ordered from the 
ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing Professional Education, 4025 Chestnut 
Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104. 
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individuals, e.g., the corporation's 
shareholders. See Treas. Reg. §25.-
2511-l(h) (1). 
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY 
Only the transfer of property is 
subject to the gift tax. No gift tax 
is imposed on account of the con­
tribution of personal services. Cf. 
Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 
21. 
Virtually every kind of property, 
tangible or intangible, including 
state and municipal securities that 
are immune from federal income 
taxes, is subject to the gift tax. 
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l (a). For ex­
ample, transfers of royalty rights, 
life insurance, partnership interests, 
and checks or notes of third parties 
are subject to the gift tax. 
The gift tax applies to transfers 
of property without full and ade­
quate consideration in money or 
money's worth regardless of the 
manner in which made. Among 
others, the tax applies to indirect 
transfers, to transfers in trust, and 
to gifts of future interests. 
Illustration a: 
F transferred $100,000 to his son, S, 
upon S's promise to pay X, his sis­
ter, a comparable annuity. F has 
made an indirect gift of the annu­
ity to X. lf, however, F made the 
gift to S with no obligation, and if 
S, on his own initiative, made a 
comparable gift to X, there are two 
gifts: F's gift td Sand S's gift to X, 
both of which are taxable events. 
Illustration b: 
If an heir or beneficiary of an es­
tate refuses to accept his interest in 
an estate, he has made a taxable 
gift if under the local law he could 
not prevent the passage of title to 
himself by renouncing. Treas. Reg. 
§25.2511-l (c); William L. Maxwell, 
17 T.C. 1589 (1952). See also Kra­
koff v. United States, 439 F.2d 1023 
(6th Cir. 1971), where a widow's 
attempted renunciation of her sur­
vivorship interest in bank accounts 
and corporate stocks she held joint­
ly with her deceased husband was 
deemed to be ineffective under state 
law and therefore her relinquish­
ment of her property rights consti­
tuted a taxable gift. Even where a 
beneficiary is permitted to renounce 
his interest in an estate, he must do 
so within a reasonable time after 
learning of the transfer to avoid 
a gift tax. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 ( c). 
lt should be noted that a sizable 
number of states, by statute, permit 
an heir to renounce his interest in 
an estate so that the renunciation 
relates back and constitutes a non­
acceptance, but many states do not. 
Section 2-801 of the Uniform Pro­
bate Code, which, at this writing, 
has been adopted by 10 states, pro­
vides for renunciation by heirs, and 
the American Bar Association has 
published a model disclaimer act in 
4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 658 
(1969). 
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Illustration c: 
G died testate in 1944 and be­
queathed his estate to a testamen­
tary trust in which his widow, W, 
had a life income interest. On W's 
death, the trust corpus was to be 
divided equally between G's two 
sons, R and S, if they survive W. 
If either son failed to survive W, 
his share of the trust corpus was to 
be distributed to his issue. W died 
in March 1963, and in May 1963, R 
filed a disclaimer of his half inter­
est in the trust, which disclaimer 
became effective in September 1963. 
Accordingly, R's half interest in the 
trust became the property of R's 
issue. The question was whether 
R's renunciation constituted a gift 
for gift tax purposes. 
In Keinarth ti. Commissioner, 480 
F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 58. 
T.C. 352 (1972), the Court held 
that, in determining whether a re­
nunciation of a remainder interest 
was made within a reasonable time, 
the period is to be measured from 
the earliest date that the remainder­
man 's interest is not subject to di­
vestiture. R's renunciation was not 
a gift for gift tax purposes, since it 
was made within six months after 
the death of the life income bene­
ficiary ( W ), which is the date on 
which R's interest became inde­
feasible. The renunciation of the 
remainder interest was timely, even 
though it was made 19 years after 
the interest was created in G's will. 
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Since R's interest was subject to di­
vestiture if he failed to survive W, 
the period is measured from W's 
death. The Commissioner and the 
Tax Court had determined that the 
period should be measured from 
the date of G's death and, there­
fore, the renunciation was a taxable 
gift. 
Illustration d: 
A fiduciary who waives his right 
to statutory commissions after per­
forming services may be deemed to 
have made a gift to the beneficiaries 
involved. Rev. Rul. 64-225, 1964-2 
CuM. BuLL. 15. However, there is 
no gift where the fiduciary waives 
his right to commissions either be­
fore commencing his services (Rev. 
Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 21), 
or within a reasonable time after 
commencing to serve where all the 
executor's actions are consistent 
with a gratuitous performance of 
services. Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 
CuM. BuLL. 20. Also, a testamen­
tary trustee's waiver of his right to 
an increase in commissions under 
a state law raising the statutory fees 
did not constitute a gift where the 
waiver was made shortly after the 
increase in fees had been adopted 
by the state legislature. Rev. Ru!. 
70-237, 1970-1 CuM. BuLL. 13. 
Generally the gift tax applies 
only to transfers of property, and 
therefore the performance of serv­
ices without compensation does not 
constitute a gift. However, once 
83 
84 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (Vol. 21-No. 5) July 15 
personal services have been con­
verted into a property right for 
compensation, it is arguable that 
the forgiveness of the debt will con­
stitute a gift. A reasonable argu­
ment can also be made that the for­
giveness in this case is merely an 
adjustment of the price to be paid 
for the services and should not con­
stitute a gift, even if the price ad­
justment is made after the services 
have been performed. The Com­
missioner's position has not yet 
been tested in litigation. 
Illustration e: 
Forgiving a debt may constitute a 
gift. Selsor R. Haygood, 42 T.C. 
936 (1964), acquiesced in result, 
1965-1 CuM. BuLL. 4. F lent his 
son, X, $12,000. Subsequently F 
forgave X the debt at a time when 
X was not financially sound and 
could have paid F only 50 cents on 
the dollar. Assuming that the can­
cellation of the debt was donatively 
motivated, F made a gift to X of 
the fair market value of X's obliga­
tion, which might be valued as low 
as $6,000. 
Illustration f: 
W owned a life insurance policy on 
the life of her husband, H, and she 
designated X as beneficiary of the 
policy. W retained the power to 
change the beneficiary of the policy. 
Upon H's death, the owner of the 
policy, W, is deemed to have made 
a gift to X, the beneficiary, of the 
proceeds of the policy. Goodman v. 
Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d 
Cir. 1946). Indeed, in such cases, 
the Commissioner has ruled that 
since the gift to X is not complete 
until after H died, the split gift 
provisions of section 2513 are not 
applicable. Rev. Ru!. 73-207, 1973-1 
CuM. BuLL. 409. 
If, however, W had irrevocably 
designated X as the beneficiary and 
had retained no other beneficial in­
terest in the policy, like the power 
to surrender the policy or to bor­
row against the cash value, the 
designation of beneficiary would 
constitute a completed gift of the 
policy at the time of designation. 
Illustration g: 
A transferred property to T in 
trust to pay the income to himself 
for life, remainder to X. The re­
mainder interest, determined by 
deducting the value of A's income 
rights, is a completed gift subject 
to the gift tax. The value of A's 
income rights at the date of trans­
fer is determined under tables set 
forth in Treas. Reg. §25.2512-9(f). 
In Johnson v. United States, 254 
F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), the 
District Court held that large bona 
fide loans to children or children­
in-law, which were repayable with­
out interest, did not constitute a 
gift for gift tax purposes. The 
Commissioner has ruled that an 
interest free loan is a gift to the 
84 
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borrower of the value of the use of 
the money, and the Commissioner 
will not follow the f ohnson deci­
sion. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 CuM. 
BULL. 408. See Gertrude H. Black­
burn, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). 
Under the Commissioner's view, 
if an interest-free loan is made for 
a term of years, with the note ma­
turing at' a specified date, the gift 
is made on the same date that the 
loan is given, and the amount of 
the gift is the value of the right to 
use the borrowed cash for the pe­
riod of the loan. However, if the 
loan is made for a noninterest bear­
ing demand note, a gift is made in 
each calendar quarter that the debt 
is outstanding of the value of the 
use of the money for that quarter. 
TRANSFERS FOR BUSINESS 
PURPOSES 
A transfer for inadequate consid­
eration is not necessarily taxed as a 
gift. ln particular, those transfers 
made in the ordinary course of 
business arc not deemed gifts, de­
spite the lack of full and adequate 
consideration. Treas. Reg. §25.2512-
8. The regulations define a busi­
ness transaction as one that is 
"bona fide, at arm's length, and 
free from any donative intent." 
Accordingly, the gift tax is not 
imposed on the sale of property for 
less than its market value where 
the seller makes an error in busi­
ness judgment. Carl E. Weller, 38 
T.C. 790 (1962), acquiesced in, 
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1968-2 CuM. BuLL. 3. Also, where a 
bargain sale to an employee is mo­
tivated by business judgment, the 
transfer is not subject to the gift 
tax. Estate of Monroe D. Anderson, 
8 T.C. 706 (1947). 
Where a transfer of property is 
made for profit motives or for the 
purpose of making a bona fide eco­
nomic settlement of a claim against 
the transferor, the gift tax is not 
usually applicable. See Catherine S. 
Beveridge, 10 T.C. 915 (1948), ac­
quiesced in, 1949-1 CuM. BuLL. 1; 
Gertrude Friedman, 40 T.C. 714 
(1963), acquiesced in, 1964-1 Cu.M. 
BULL. 4. 
Political Contributions 
The Commissioner has ruled that 
contributions to political organiza­
tions and political action groups 
are subject · to the gift tax, even 
though the donor may hope to 
profit therefrom. Rev. Rul. 59-57, 
1959-1 CUM. BuLL. 626. His view 
was undercut by the decision in 
Stern ti. United States, 436 F.2d 
1327 (5th Cir. 1971), where the tax­
payer had given large contributions 
to secure the election of a "reform 
slate" that was dedicated to curing 
the economic ills of the State of 
Louisiana. The Court held that the 
contributions were not gifts be­
cause of the business transaction 
exception. Since it was conceded 
that the contributions were made 
bona fide, at arm's length, and 
without donative intent, the satis-
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faction of these three criteria re­
moved the transfer from the gift 
category. 
The ruling in Stern conforms 
with the purpose of the gift tax· to 
complement the estate and income 
taxes by exacting a tax on the trans­
fer of property to another. A politi­
cal contribution is more like con­
sumption than transfer, on which a 
gift tax should not be imposed. 
However, the Commissioner an­
nounced that he will not follow the 
Stern decision except in cases in the 
Fifth Circuit that are factually in­
distinguishable. TIR-1125 (1972), 
Rev. Ru!. 72-583, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 
534, and Rev. Ru!. 72-355, 1972-2 
CuM. BULL. 532. 
The Commissioner did rule that 
contributions made by a donor to 
a number of political organizations 
will be treated as a gift to separate 
donees, each of which can qualify 
for the $3,000 annual exclusion, ex­
cept that organizations which have 
essentially the same officers and 
supported candidates and no sub­
stantial independent purpose will 
be treated as one donee, and gifts 
to them will be aggregated. Rev. 
Ru!. 72-355, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 532. 
See Rev. Ru!. 74-199 for a state­
ment of the evidentiary require­
ments that must be satisfied to 
qualify a gift to a political organi­
zation for an annual exclusion. 
Believing that the Commission­
er's ruling was too generous to 
political donors, and that gifts to 
political organizations which sup­
port the same candidate should be 
aggregated, one consumer-type 
group brought an injunctive suit 
against the Commissioner to pre­
vent him from applying his ruling, 
and the ruling was held invalid by 
the District ·Court for the District 
of Columbia. Tax Analysts & Ad­
vocates v. Shultz, 34 Am. Fed. 
Tax R.2d 74-5289 (D.C. 1974). It 
appears that the Government will 
appeal this decision, presumably 
both on the merits and on the ques­
tion of jurisdiction. Cf. Bob fones 
University v. Simon, 33 Am. Fed. 
Tax R.2d 74-1279 (USSC 1974); 
Alexander v. "Americans United," 
Inc., 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-1289 
(USSC 1974). 
1t is noteworthy that Congress is 
currently considering a statutory 
proposal that would exempt gifts to 
political organizations from the gift 
tax. 
INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS 
The gift tax applies only to vol­
untary transfers of property. Thus, 
a payment made under the com­
pulsion of a tort judgment dod 
not constitute a gift. Cf. Harris v. 
Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950). 
The payment of an award might 
also meet the criteria of the regu­
lations defining business transac­
tions. Treas. Reg. §25.2512-8. 
TRANSFERS FOR CONSIDERATION 
A transfer of property is not re-
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moved from the reach of the gift 
tax merely because it was made for 
consideration. To be exempt from 
tax, the consideration received must 
equal in value the property trans­
ferred and must be received "in 
money or money's worth." Moral 
consideration, past consideration, 
or consideration in the form of a 
detriment to the transferee that 
does not benefit the trans£ eror will 
not bar the imposition of the tax. 
Illustration a: 
Since the remarriage of X, a widow, 
to A would result in her forfeiting 
·a $100,000 interest in a trust estab­
lished by her first husband, A gave 
her $100,000 upon her promise to 
marry him. There is a gift from A 
to X. X's promise to marry A is 
not sufficient consideration because 
it cannot be valued in money or 
money's worth. Although X's loss 
of interest in the trust is a detri­
ment to her, it does not constitute 
a benefit to A. Thus, there is a gift 
tax on A's transfer. Commissioner 
v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945). 
Relinquishment of Marital Riglits 
Under the estate tax statutes, the 
relinquishment of marital rights, 
incuding dower, curtesy, and statu­
tory estates in lieu thereof, does not 
constitute consideration in money 
or money's worth. Code, §2043(b). 
The Supreme Court has applied 
this estate tax provision to the gitt 
tax on the ground that the two 
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taxes are in pari materia. Merrill v. 
Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945). Accord­
ingly, a husband's transfer of prop­
erty in exchange for his wife's re­
linquishment of her marital rights 
constitutes a taxable gift to the 
wife. 
However, under section 2516, a 
transfer of property from one 
spouse to the other pursuant to a 
written agreement relative to their 
marital and property rights shall be 
deemed to have been made for "fuil 
and adequate consideration in 
money or money's worth," provided 
that the spouses are divorced within 
two years after the execution of the 
agreement. 
Although every effort should be 
made to comply with section 2516 
where applicable, if, for some rea­
son, the terms of the statute are not 
satisfied-if, e.g., the divorce oc­
curs more than two years after the 
agreement-the transferor may con­
tend that a transfer in anticipation 
of a divorce is not voluntarily made 
and therefore is exempt from the 
tax. The Supreme Court's decision 
in Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 
106 (1950), provides substantial sup­
port for that contention. See Rosen­
thal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 
(2d Cir. 1953). But it is unlikely 
that the Service will accept that 
contention without litigating the 
issue. 
Relinquishment of Support 
It now appears settled that a 
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wife's relinquishment of her right 
to support constitutes consideration 
in "money or money's worth." The 
Service has ruled that support 
rights are money's worth, Rev. Rul. 
68-379, 1968-2 Cur.r. BuLL. 414, su­
perseding E.T. 19, 1946-2 CuM. 
BULL. 166, though there are two 
court decisions involving estate 
taxes to the contrary. Meyer's Es­
tate v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 367 
(2d Cir. 1940); Estate of Robert 
Manning McKeon, 25 T.C. 697, 
706-707 (1956), acquiesced in, 1958-
2 Cur.r. BuLL. 6. The administra­
tive position of the Service, as evi­
denced by its rulings, and the more 
recent court decisions clearly es­
tablish that the wife's support rights 
qualify as money's worth consid­
eration. See H.B. Hundley, 52 T.C. 
495 (1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1311 (4th 
Cir. 1971); Estate of Hubert Keller, 
44 T.C. 851 (1965); Estate of Mor-
.rison T. O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648 (1967), 
acquiesced in, 1967-2 Cur.r. BuLL. 3. 
A transfer in satisfaction of the 
duty to support the minor children 
of the transferor is made · for 
money's worth. Estate of Robert 
Manning McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 
(1956), acquiesced in, 1958-2 CuM. 
BULL. 6. 
Support payments to indigent 
adult children that are required to 
be made by state law were held to 
be gifts in Commissioner v. Greene, 
119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1941 ), cert. 
denied, 314 U.S. 641 (1941). How­
ever, Greene was decided by a di-
vided court and the result is diffi­
cult to rationalize. 
INCOMPLETE TRANSFERS 
A transfer of property is not sub­
ject to the gift tax unless it is com­
plete and irrevocable. A transfer 
that may be revoked by the donor 
· alone or in conjunction with any 
party who does not have a substan­
tial adverse interest in the revoca­
tion is not a completed gift for tax 
purposes. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 
288 U.S. 280 (1933). Similarly, 
where the donor has retained the 
power, either alone or in conjunc­
tion with others who do not have 
a substantial adverse interest, to 
change the beneficiaries of the gift, 
the transfer is not complete for gift 
tax purposes. Sanford's Estate v. 
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). 
1f the donor's power to change 
beneficiaries is limited to the bene+ 
ficiaries of either the income or the 
remainder interest in the trans­
ferred property, then the gift is in­
complete as to that interest only. 
Thus, if the donor retained the 
power to change the income bene­
ficiary of a trust from A to B, but 
he did not retain a power to change 
the remainderman, the gift of the 
income interest is incomplete, but 
the gift to the remainderman is 
complete. 
Illustration a: 
A transferred property to T in 
trust for A for life, remainder to 
88 
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B. This is a completed gift of the 
remainder interest, because the do­
nor has relinquished all control 
over that interest. However, if A had 
retained the power to revoke the 
whole trust, there is no gift. If A 
can revoke only with the consent 
of T, who does not have a substan­
tial adverse interest, there is no 
completed gift. If A can revoke 
only with B's consent, then the gift 
is complete. 
The mere delivery without con­
sideration of a personal check or 
note of the transferor does not con­
stitute a completed gift, because 
no enforceable obligation is in­
curred. The Service has stated that 
the transfer of a personal check be­
. comes complete and therefore tax­
able when it is paid, certified, or 
accepted by the drawee, or is ne­
gotiated for value to a third person. 
Similarly, payment or transfer for 
value is necessary to complete a 
gift of a negotiable note. Rev. Rul. 
67-396, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 351. 
Though there exists a conflict 
among the court decisions which 
have passed on these transfers­
compare /ohn D. Archbold, 42 
B.T.A. 453 (1940), with Commis­
sioner v. Copley's Estate, 194 F.2d 
364 (7th Cir. 1952), aff'g 15 T.C. 
17 (1950)-the more recent deci­
sions support the Service. E.g., 
Eleanor· A. Bradford, 34 T.C. 1059, 
1065 (1960). See Rev. Rul. 69-347, 
1969-1 CuM. BuLL. 227. 
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A gift causa mortis is incomplete 
during the life of the donor. If a 
transfer is made in anticipation of 
death from a specific illness and 
contingent on such death occurring, 
and if the transferor recovers from 
his illness and the transferee ac­
cordingly returns the funds, neither 
the original transfer nor the return 
of the funds to the transferor is 
subject to the gift tax. Rev. Ruf. 
74-365, 1074 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 28. 
Completed Transfers 
Where the donor's power to alter 
or revoke the transfer can be exer­
cised only with the consent of a 
party with a substantially adverse 
interest, the transfer is complete for 
gift tax purposes. Commissioner v . 
Prouty, 115 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1940). 
Illustration b: 
A transferred property to T in 
trust for C for life, remainder to 
D, and A reserved the power to 
alter or amend the trust as he sees 
fit. The transfer is not complete 
and there is no taxable gift. If, 
however, A later amends the trust 
so that he can exercise the power 
of further amendment only with 
the consent of C, there will then be 
a complete transfer and a taxable 
gift on C's life estate, but not as to 
D's remainder interest. The gift of 
C's life estate is effected on the date 
that the amendment was made. C 
does not have an adverse interest as 
to A's alteration of the remainder 
89 
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interest in the trust; hence the re­
quirement that C consent to such 
alterations does not render com­
plete the transfer of the remainder 
interest in the trust. 
Where the donor's reserved power 
to alter a transfer can affect only 
the time when the transferred 
property will be received by the 
beneficiaries, there is a completed 
gift at the date of the transfer. 
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-2( d). 
Illustration c: 
A transferred property to T in trust 
to pay the income annually to B 
for 20 years, and at the end of that 
period, to distribute the corpus to 
B or B's estate. A retained the 
power to direct T to accumulate 
the income in any year and to dis­
tribute it together with the corpus 
after the expiration of the 20:year 
period. B's interest in the trust is 
vested, and only the timing of en­
joyment is subject to change. 
Therefore, A has made a completed 
gift that is subject to the gift tax. 
Of course, when the grantor has 
a power to revoke subject to the 
approval of an adverse party, or 
when he has the power to affect the 
timing of enjoyment of the trans­
fer, the property is includable in the 
gross estate of the donor at his 
death under section 2038, even 
though the transfer is treated as a 
completed gift. 
Where a donor retains a power 
such as the power to revoke, pre­
venting a transfer from constitut­
ing a completed gift, the subse­
quent relinquishment of that power 
by the grantor creates a gift at the 
date of relinquishment. Treas. Reg. 
§25.2511-2(f). Similarly, when in­
come from an incomplete transfer 
is paid to a beneficiary and thus 
placed beyond the control of the 
donor, there is a completed gift ot 
the income at the date of payment. 
Illustration d: 
A declared himself trustee of cer­
tain properties owned by him. Un­
der the declaration of trust, the 
trustee is to distribute the income 
quarterly between B and C in such 
proportions as the trustee shall de­
termine in his discretion. Upon the 
death of the survivor of B and C, 
the trust corpus is to be distributed 
to X or his estate. The trust is irre­
vocable. Since A retained the power 
as trustee to change the proportion­
ate interests of B and C, the gift of 
the income interests was incom­
plete, and consequently A incurred 
no gift tax liability. However, the 
gift of the remainder interest to X 
was complete. Subsequently, A re­
signed, and T was appointed as 
trustee in A's place. Since A's 
power over the income interest was 
terminated by his resignation, the 
gift of the income interest became 
complete at that date. Prior to the 
resignation of A, any current in-
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come of the trust that was actually 
distributed by the trustee to either 
B or C was placed beyond A's 
power of control, and consequently 
there was a completed gift of the 
distributed income on the date of 
distribution from the trust. 
Joint Accounts and Savings Bonds 
One of the most commonly re­
curring examples of an incomplete 
transfer is the creation of a joint 
bank account. Since the grantor 
alone may withdraw any Of all of 
the funds from the joint account, 
he has retained a power of revoca­
tion and there is no completed gift. 
However, when the donee actually 
withdraws funds from the account 
and thereby removes those funds 
from the control of the grantor, 
there is a gift of the funds in ques­
tion at the date of withdrawal. 
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l(h)(4). Of 
course, if local law required the 
donee to return the withdrawn 
funds upon the donor's demand, 
the gift would not be complete on 
withdrawal; but if the donor fails 
to demand return of the funds, at 
some subsequent date the donor's 
inaction may be deemed his acqui­
escence in the withdrawal, which 
will then be a completed gift. 
Similarly, if A purchases a 
United States savings bond regis­
tered as payable to "A or B," 
there is no gift to B unless and 
until B surrenders the bond for 
cash. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l(h)(4). 
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Also, the creation of and contri­
bution to a joint brokerage account 
registered in the name of a nom­
inee of the brokerage firm does not 
constitute a gift unless and until 
the joint owner draws on the ac­
count for his benefit. Rev. Rul. 69-
148, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 226. 
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED 
INTERESTS 
Transfers of property in which 
the donor retains a reversionary in­
terest are subject to the gift tax. 
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 
(1943). 
Illustration a: 
F transferred property to T in trust 
for X for life, remainder to X's 
children who are living at X's 
death. There is a valid gift of the 
remainder, even though X might 
not have children at the time of 
the transfer, and even if X has chil­
dren living at that time, they might 
· not survive X, thus creating the 
possibility that the property may 
revert to F on X's death. 
In this event, the value of the 
donor's reversionary interest must 
be deducted from the property 
transferred in order to determine 
the value of the gift. The donor , 
has the burden of proving the 
value of his retained interest, and if 
his interest is so speculative as to 
have no ascertainable value under 
recognized actuarial methods, the 
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amount of the gift is treated as 
equal to the entire value of the 
property transferred. Robinette ti. 
Helt1ering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943). 
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l(e). Simi­
larly, if the donor retains a life 
estate in the transferred property, 
the gift tax will be imposed on the 
value of the remainder. Robinette 
ti. Helt1ering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943). 
Of course, the retention of a life 
estate will cause the inclusion of 
the transferred property in the 
gross estate of the donor upon his 
death, notwithstanding the fact 
that the transfer was previously 
taxed under the gift tax laws. Code, 
§2036. 
Where the donor has transferred 
property in trust and where a non­
adverse third party, such as an in­
dependent trustee, has the discre­
tionary power to make distributions 
of principal or income to the donor, 
the gift tax consequences will de­
pend upon the extent of the third 
party's discretion. If the discretion­
ary power of the third party to 
make distributions to the grantor 
is limited by an external standard, 
then the donor's contingent interest 
must be valued as of the date of 
transfer. The amount of the com­
pleted gift is deemed to be the 
0 value of the property transferred 
in trust less the value of the donor's 
contingent interest. Rev. Rul. 54-
538, 1954-2 Cu.M. BuLL. 316. 
Where the external standards are 
so encompassing that there is no 
limit on the amount of trust cor­
pus that might be distributed to the 
donor, the gift will be treated as 
incomplete. See Estate of Leon 
Holtz, 38 T.C. 37 (1962), acqui­
esced in, 1962-2 Cul\1. BuLL. 4; Com­
missioner ti. Vander Weele, 254 
F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'g 
27 T.C. 340, acquiesced in, 1962-2 
CuM. BuLL. 5. See also Rev. Rul. 
62-13, 1962-1 Cur.1. BuLL. 181. 
The Service has ruled that where 
a third party is given very broad 
discretion to make distributions of 
principal to the donor, including 
transfers where the third party's 
power to invade is not limited by 
external standards, so that there is 
no assurance at the time of trans­
fer that anything of value will pass 
to a beneficiary of the trust, the gift 
is not complete for gift tax pur­
poses. Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-1 Cul\1. 
BuLL. 181. But see Herzog ti. Com­
missioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 
1941). 
VOID AND VOIDABLE TRANSFERS 
1£ the transferor of property is 
incompetent, his attempted trans­
fer is void and no gift tax is im­
posed. However, a gift tax will be 
imposed upon a gift made by an 
incompetent's lawfully appointed 
guardian who was authorized to 
make the gift on behalf of the in­
competent. Rev. Rul. 67-280, 1967-2 
Cul\1. BuLL. 349. 
If the transferor of property is 
under a temporary disability such 
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as infancy, and if the transferor can 
affirm or rescind the transfer when 
the disability has been removed, 
there is no gift at the time of trans­
fer, but a gift will be deemed to 
have been made when the trans­
feror's disability is removed and he 
does not rescind the transfer with­
in a reasonable time. Commissioner 
ti. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 680 
(1940). 
It is not clear whether a transfer 
that is voidable for reasons other 
than disability, as, for example, a 
transfer voidable under the Statute 
of Frauds, is subject to the gift tax 
when made. 
NONRESIDENT ALIENS 
From 1955 to 1966, a transfer of 
intangible property made by a non­
resident who was not a citizen and 
who was not engaged in business 
in the United States was exempt 
from the gift tax. This provision 
has been amended to delete the 
nonbusiness requirement. Thus, for 
1967 and all succeeding years, a 
nonresident who is not a citizen 
is exempt from the gift tax on 
transfers of intangible property. 
Code, §2501(a). This exemption 
from gift tax may not apply to 
gifts made by a donor within 10 
years after having lost his Ameri-
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can citizenship. Code, §250l(a)(3). 
However, the gift tax does apply 
to transfers by a nonresident non­
citizen of real property and tangi­
ble personal property located in 
the United States. A resident is a 
person who was domiciled in the 
United States at the time of the 
gift. Treas. Reg. §25.2501-l(b). 
SURVIVORSHIP ANNUITY BENEFITS 
If an annuitant acquires an an­
nuity for himself that contains a 
provision for a survivorship annu­
ity or for a refund upon the death 
of the annuitant, a taxable gift 
from the annuitant to the bene­
ficiary entitled to the survivorship 
or refund benefits is made on the 
date that the designation of such 
beneficiary becomes irrevocable. See 
Treas. Reg. §25.2512-6, Ex. (5); 
I.T. 3322, 1939-2 CuM. BuLL. 177; 
Rev. Rul. 70-514, 1970-2 CuM. BuLL. 
198; Rev. Rul. 72-62, 1972-1 CuM. 
BuLL. 312; Wagner, fr. ti. United 
States, 387 F.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
However, no gift tax is imposed 
where an irrevocable designation of 
the beneficiary is made by an em­
ployee entitled to an annuity under 
certain qualified deferred compen­
sation plans, except to the extent 
that the value of the annuity is 
attributable to contributions of the 
employee. Code, §2517. 
A man's rights often depend upon his estimating correctly what a 
jury will later decide. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
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